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With China continuing to make economic forays into Central Asia, attention has simultaneously turned to 
Russia’s privileged position in the region. A cursory glance through many articles concerned with the ‘Russia 
- Central Asia - China’ dynamic provides a misleading impression that Beijing’s strengthened ties with the 
countries of Central Asia are coming at the expense of Moscow’s influence. This paper will show that 
events, conventionally characterized as breakthroughs in the ‘China - Central Asia’ relationship in the last 
four to five years, are in fact part and parcel of larger economic trends that began long before the inking of 
the  energy and trade deals. The reality of China’s growing economic influence in Central Asia is not 
disputed. What this paper will argue is that despite the heralded dislodging of Russia by China, Russia will 
continue to play a substantial role in the region through a combination of energy, culture, and military bonds 
that run much too deep for Beijing to sever in the short to medium term. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For Central Asia watchers 2009 seemed to mark a watershed for the region, for it was then that 
the spigots on the long discussed Turkmenistan-China natural gas pipeline were at last 
opened. The 1833 km pipeline, running through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, was heralded not 
only as a precursor to further regional integration and a feat of engineering – being built in just 
18 months – but was also accompanied by discussions of the simultaneous ascendency of 
China in Central Asia and the end of regional hegemony for Moscow.1 
That China’s influence in Central Asia has grown exponentially in the previous decade 
is undeniable. 2010 saw Beijing establish itself as the region’s primary trading partner –
negotiating deals worth an estimated €23 billion ($30 billion),2 increasing impressively from 
only $572 million in 1992.3  The numbers exceeded the EU’s trade figures, but also Russia’s, 
which, alarmingly for Moscow, fell to third place at €17 billion ($22 billion).4 
Amid the myriad of figures concerning pipelines and trade, it would be prudent to 
begin by asking what exactly China seeks in Central Asia. In an area that has seen its 
importance rise precipitously since the terrorist attacks of 11 September, the attendant 
dialogue of the region post-2014 falls into speculation of what China’s rise means for each 
country in Central Asia and, indeed, for the Russian Federation. 
                                                          
1 Stephan Blank, ‘The Strategic Implications of the Turkmenistan-China Pipeline Project’, China Brief, Volume 10, Issue 3 
(2010), 
<http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36010&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=4
14&no_cache=1#.UofDeNJmiSo> [accessed 16 November 2013]. 
2 Sebastian Peyrouse, Jos Boonstra and Marlene Laurelle, ‘Security and Development Approaches to Central Asia: the EU 
compared to China and Russia’,  EUCAM  (2012), p. 11, 
 < http://www.eucentralasia.eu/uploads/tx_icticontent/WP11.pdf> [accessed 11 November 2013]. 
3 ‘Central Asia: Report Looks at China’s Role in Central Asia’, Eurasianet.org (2013), 
<http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66607> [accessed 16 November 2013]. 
4 Peyrouse, Boonstra and Laurelle, p. 9.  
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In a paper for EUCAM’s Security and Development project, Sébastien Peyrouse, Jos 
Boonstra, and Marlène Laruelle identified China’s four main interests in Central Asia, in no 
order of priority: 1) militating against Uyghur separatism; 2) keeping its western 
neighborhood stable to decrease the risk of a situation that would necessitate Chinese 
intervention; 3) gaining access to energy and raw materials; 4) opening up Central Asian 
markets to Chinese companies and products.5 
While the first two issues are largely Sino-specific, governments in Central Asia have 
been keen to exploit Beijing’s desire for reliable sources of energy and market share, seeing the 
burgeoning economic relationship as reciprocally beneficial. For China’s Communist Party 
leadership, energy is critically important in order to maintain stability and growth. Faced with 
numerous challenges, including environmental degradation and rampant corruption, keeping 
the lights on and factories producing are essential elements in controlling public disaffection. 
As over half of Asia’s overall energy imports travel through the narrow three-mile-wide 
Malacca Straights, a significant maritime dispute in South East Asia carries the potential to 
reverberate far into the Chinese hinterland. Thus Beijing’s acquisition of Central Asian energy 
is not merely sound business policy, but an insurance against a serious threat to its foreign 
energy links in Africa and the Middle East.6 Thus Beijing’s current motivations in Central Asia 
are quite clear, and follow the similar arrangements established all over the world. The 
countries comprising Central Asia are strategically located on, or very close to, China’s 
western border. 
For all of China’s progress in Central Asia, it would be premature to believe that it 
carries enough momentum to dislodge Russia from the traditional position of significance it 
has maintained with its southern neighbors since the collapse of the Soviet Union. While 
platitudes about a new Great Game arising in Central Asia make  headlines and panel 
discussions more sensational, the facts surrounding China’s prevalence belie the contemporary 
narrative of its dominance that seems to focus entirely on Turkmen energy contracts 
(notoriously difficult for all parties involved) and wider regional trade deals. 
 
 
CASE STUDY 
 
The following pages will attempt to show that Moscow’s status in Central Asia, albeit 
diminished as a result of nearsighted policies, high energy prices, and a rising China, will 
nevertheless remain dominant in the short to medium term. This is expected not only on 
account of legacy ties, but is also supported by the fact that Central Asia represents one of the 
last locations in the world where Russia exercises soft power. Substantive Chinese inroads into 
the Central Asian economy should not be discredited. On a bi-lateral basis, however, taking 
into account the importance of foreign remittances, language, fuel transfers, pipeline networks, 
and security contacts, Russia continues to husband a privileged regional position. 
                                                          
5 Ibid., p. 11. 
6 Kent E. Calder, The New Continentalism: Energy and Twenty-First Century Eurasian Geopolitics (Yale University Press, 
2012), p. 35. 
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To begin, Turkmenistan’s 2011 agreement to supply up to 60 billion cubic meters (bcm) 
of natural gas annually to China, as a result of the completion of the Central Asia-China gas 
pipeline two years earlier, followed the fashionable narrative of Russian decline in Central 
Asia.7 But seen within the context of previous Turkmen-Russian business negotiations, as well 
as energy relationships Ashgabat fostered prior to the opening of the Central Asia-China 
pipeline, the deal need not necessarily be viewed as a bellwether for greater regional change at 
the expense of Russia. 
Much has been written about the bizarre nature of Turkmenistan’s orientation during 
the rule of the late President Niyazov, with one filmmaker going so far as to characterize the 
country as a ‘dictator’s Disneyland’.8 Yet behind the personality cult of Turkmenbashi replete 
with rotating golden statues was a savvy energy and foreign policy that provided the small 
desert nation of around five million people the wherewithal to forge an independent path 
early on after the fall of communism. 
Only four years after achieving independence, Turkmenistan’s self-pronounced policy 
of international neutrality was formally accepted by the U.N. General Assembly in December 
1995.9 Although this did not preclude Ashgabat from staying within the former Soviet orbit, 
joining as an unofficial observer nation in the Commonwealth of Independent States, its 
relations with other member countries have been rocky as evidenced by the establishment of a 
visa requirement for CIS citizens in 1999.10 Exhortations to join additional Russian-led regional 
organizations have fallen on deaf ears. 
In 1997, long before Chinese forays into Central Asia, Turkmenistan opened Central 
Asia’s first pipeline outside the former Soviet space southwards to Iran.11 Little notice was 
taken of these events at the time, and despite a series of proceeding energy agreements 
between Ashgabat and Tehran, including the January 2010 completion of a second pipeline 
which expanded Turkmen export capacity to Iran to 424 bcf/y, 12 discussions about Turkmen 
gas have remained focused on the anticipated zero-sum competition for regional influence 
between China and Russia.13 
One could certainly be sympathetic with the perceptions of a Sino-Russian rivalry 
considering that the completion of the 2009 Central Asia-China pipeline was followed by an 
agreement between Gazprom and Turkmen officials the year after, increasing the price 
                                                          
7 Tom Balmforth, ‘Turkmenistan: China Export Deal Undercuts Gazprom’s Leverage’, Eurasianet.org (2011), 
<www.eurasianet.org/node/64609> [accessed 16 November 2013]. 
8 President for Life (Journeyman Pictures, 2005), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KNJS2-Zv-Tc > [accessed 16 
November 2013]. 
9 ‘Latest Developments’, Embassy of Turkmenistan in Vienna website, <http://www.botschaft-turkmenistan.at/en/news.htm> 
[accessed 27 April 2013]. 
10 Martha Brill Olcott, Anders Aslund and Sherman W. Garnett, Getting it Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), p. 19. 
11 Jim Nichol, ‘Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests’, in Congressional Research Service Report (2012), p. 
7, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-1055.pdf> [accessed 16 November 2013].  
12 ‘Country Analysis Brief: Turkmenistan’, US Energy Information Administration website (2012), p. 8, 
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=TX> [accessed 16 November 2013].  
13 Ibid., pp. 7-8.  
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Russia’s state-owned energy giant paid for Turkmen gas imports to $220 - $250 per thousand 
cubic meters.14 
Going back into the business relationship between Turkmen and Russian authorities, a 
pattern emerges which presents Gazprom’s acquiescence to higher prices following the 
construction of the pipeline to China as not an entirely reactionary move by Moscow hoping to 
curtail further Chinese inroads into Central Asia. Rather the agreement was part and parcel of 
a long standing dispute over the price of Turkmen gas that began years prior. Russian 
purchases of Turkmen, and indeed Central Asian, gas before 2009 were representative of a 
larger strategy, articulated by the Carnegie Endowment’s Martha Olcott, who wrote: 
 
Central Asian reserves provided Moscow with the cushion it would need to maintain its 
external market position, while Russia’s energy industry was first reorganized and then 
new assets [were] exploited to secure Russia’s position in the global energy market for the 
first half of the 21st century.15 
 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, at a time of low energy prices and when Central 
Asian nations struggled to build up nascent professional capabilities and remained reliant on 
the Soviet era pipeline infrastructure, the arrangement described by Olcott worked 
exceedingly well for Russian energy companies. Richard Ericson writes on Gazprom’s 
relations with Turkmenistan as having been ‘able to exploit its monopsony position to pay 
extraordinary low prices,’ in a strategy that ‘included securing other FSU producers of natural 
gas to support its supply to Europe, using control over all the export pipelines out of the 
region’.16 
For Turkmenistan, this agreement began in earnest in 2003 with a 25 year accord between 
Gazprom and Turkmen authorities for Russia to purchase natural gas at $44 per thousand 
cubic meters (tcm).17 The agreement stipulated that price negotiations could periodically be 
revisited, something the then President Niyazov used to his full advantage in 2005, when 
Turkmenistan demanded an increase to $65 per tcm and again in September 2006, when 
Niyazov successfully lobbied Gazprom to raise the export price of Turkmen gas to $100 per 
tcm during 2007-2009.18 
                                                          
14 Vladimir Socor, ‘Russia Resuming Gas Imports From Turkmenistan on a Small Scale’, The Jamestown Foundation 
website (2010), < http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35866> [accessed 16 
November 2013]. 
15 Martha Brill Olcott, ‘Russia, Central Asia, and the Caspian: How important is the Energy and Security Trade-Off?’, James 
Baker III Institute for Public Policy website (2009), p. 14, <http://bakerinstitute.org/files/519/> [accessed 16 November 
2013].  
16 Richard E. Ericson, ‘Eurasian Natural Gas: Significance and Recent Developments’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 
Volume 53, Issue 5 (2012), p. 632, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2747/1539-
7216.53.5.615?journalCode=rege20#.UofWj9JmiSo> [accessed 16 November 2013].   
17 Olcott, p.16. 
18 Sergei Blagov, ‘Russia Bows to Gas Pricing Demand’, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology website (2006), 
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?ots783=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-
e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=52430> [accessed 16 November 2013].  
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Considering that during this period of fitful negotiations Gazprom was selling natural 
gas to consumers in Europe at a substantial markup in the range of $210-230 per tcm, repeated 
Turkmen entreaties for price hikes in the mid 2000s were not in danger of undercutting 
Gazprom’s bottom line.19 Moreover these protracted discussions are indicative of a pattern 
that contradicts the assumption that Turkmenistan’s insistence on market based prices in 2009-
2010, which led to Gazprom agreeing to pay $220 - $250/ tcm, was a direct result of China’s 
pipeline leverage that did not exist before.20 
The period 2009-2010 is significant, however, in that Russia’s policy of benign neglect of 
Turkmenistan, specifically, and Central Asia generally began to show signs of vulnerability in 
relation to the Kremlin’s regional strategy. 
Much of the blame for the Kremlin’s perceived and real weaknesses in Central Asia lay 
with the Russian state itself. At the height of the world economic crisis in 2008-2009 European 
demand for Russian natural gas atrophied, quickly exposing Russia’s brittle economic 
foundations that relied excessively on hydro carbon exports. Cheap gas from Central Asia, 
which had always buttressed Moscow’s dual approach of subsidizing domestic consumers 
while sending the remainder to lucrative markets in Central and Western Europe, was 
suddenly redundant. 
When European demand abruptly shrank in 2009 and natural gas prices inevitably fell, 
Moscow attempted to put the brakes on with regards to the Turkmen gas imports, fearing an 
oversaturated market would depress prices further. This unilateral and ill-conceived decision 
taken in April 2009 reduced Gazprom’s imports from Turkmenistan substantially, causing a 
rupture in the Central Asian Center (CAC) pipeline at a location near the Turkmen-Uzbek 
border.21 Whether this event was an impartial mistake or deliberate act of sabotage remains a 
source of debate on both sides. Regardless of culpability, Russian imports of Turkmen gas 
didn’t resume until almost a year later. 
Russia’s reduced purchases of Turkmen gas from a high of 41.6 billion cubic meters in 
2007 to 10.7 billion cubic meters in 2010 was remarkable.22 The result left Gazprom’s 
reputation as a dependable buyer of gas in doubt and caused major financial hindrances for 
Ashgabat which was reported to have lost a billion dollars a month during the ordeal.23 All 
told, the misfortune is estimated to have cost Turkmenistan one fourth of its annual GDP in 
2009.24 
                                                          
19 Henrik Bergsager, ‘China, Russia and Central Asia: The Energy Dilemma’, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute website (2012), 
p. 15, < www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNI-R1612.pd> [accessed 16 November 2013].  
20 John Daly, ‘Green Eyed Gazprom Attacks Turkmenistan's Natural Gas Resources’, Oilprice.com (2011),  
<http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Green-Eyed-Gazprom-Attacks-Turkmenistans-Natural-Gas-Resources.html > 
[accessed 16 November 2013]. 
21 Ibid.  
22 ‘Gas Purchases, Strategy’, Gazprom.com, < http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/central-asia/> [accessed 27 April 
2013]. 
23 ‘Turkmenistan: Desperate for a Gas Market’, Forbes.com, 29 April (2010), 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2010/04/29/turkmenistan-desperate-for-a-gas-market/ > [accessed 16 November 
2013].  
24 Deirdre Tynan, ‘Turkmenistan: Gas Flows Again to Russia while Discontent Simmers’, Eurasianet.org (2010), 
<www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav011410.shtm> [accessed 16 November 2013]. 
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Under these circumstances, Turkmenistan’s appreciation for China’s consumer market as 
an alternative destination for its gas was as much about economics as it was about strategy. It 
is relevant to note, however, that despite all the problems attributed to the CAC pipeline 
explosion in April 2009, including China’s role as subsequent Turkmen benefactor, Russia 
continues to be an important transit point for Turkmenistan’s energy exports.25 
Chinese advances into Russia’s ‘near abroad’ have been spurred on in part by a 
protracted dispute between Moscow and Beijing over the price of energy.  Writing a recent 
article in The Diplomat, Scott Harold and Lowell Schwartz summed up the dilemma facing 
Russia and China as both seek to gain the upper hand in energy trade negotiations: 
 
In the realm of bilateral energy trade, China’s goal is to acquire as much cheap and reliable 
energy as possible without relying too heavily on any single-nation source, which could be 
disrupted by an unexpected bilateral crisis. For its part, Moscow wants to retain as much 
leverage as possible over the price of the natural resources it sells and to avoid becoming 
dependent upon China as a destination for its energy exports.26 
 
While the relationship is flourishing in terms of oil - China is poised to become Russia’s 
largest petroleum export market from 2018 onward – a natural gas agreement, being 
negotiated without an international pricing scheme, has been exceedingly difficult to finalize.27 
This has led Chinese leaders to seek sources of energy from a variety of regions, including 
Central Asia. 
Talk of a renewed energy focused ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia between China, the West, 
and Russia must be tempered with statistics to give a more contextual picture of Central Asia’s 
contributions to China’s overall energy strategy. Looking closely at the numbers, it is apparent 
that Central Asia accounts for a small fraction of China’s overall energy portfolio. According to 
the U.S. Energy Information Agency, in 2009 natural gas made up just 4 percent of the 
country’s total energy consumption, with oil and coal dwarfing that figure, representing 19 
and 70 percent respectively.28  
Moreover, China’s leading exporter of oil emanating from Central Asia in 2011 – Kazakhstan - 
which supplied 224,000 barrels per day, was itself surpassed by the Russian Federation, which 
shipped 395,000 barrels per day eastward.29 
In light of the speculation concerning long-term European demand, coupled with 
forecasts that China’s internal oil consumption may reach upwards of 17 million barrels per 
                                                          
25 ‘Country Analysis Brief: Turkmenistan’, p. 5. 
26 Scott W. Harold and Lowell Schwartz, ‘A Russia-China Alliance Brewing?’, The Diplomat website (2013), 
<http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/12/a-russia-china-alliance-brewing/> [accessed 16 November 2013]. 
27 Zachary Keck, ‘China’s Changing Oil Calculus’, The Diplomat website (2013), <http://thediplomat.com/china-
power/chinas-changing-oil-calculus/> [accessed 26 April 2013]. 
28 ‘Country Analysis Brief: China’, US Energy Information Administration website (2013), 
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH> [accessed 16 November 2013]. 
29 Ibid. 
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day by 2030, Sino-Russian energy cooperation is likely to increase over time.30 Indeed, viewing 
China as a reliable and growing export destination, Russia’s elites have called for expanded 
trade opportunities between the two nations.31 
With regards to the economic activity in Central Asia, Beijing appears to be employing 
tactics similar to those used in resource-rich areas like Africa and Latin America. These regions 
are characterized by their high demand for a ‘no strings attached’ development assistance, 
labor, and cheap products. 
For the countries of Central Asia, the flood of relatively inexpensive Chinese goods has 
not only allowed poorer residents in countries like Kyrgyzstan to obtain basic necessities  like 
fruits and vegetables,32 but has also spawned a lucrative cross-border trade by enterprising 
individual merchants in cities like Almaty.33 Yet in the area of mutually beneficial trade, 
China’s presence in the region has, fairly or unfairly, attracted criticism from Central Asians 
sources, which complain of a shrinking domestic manufacturing base, poor quality consumer 
goods, and the low public esteem of Chinese businessmen.34 
Part of the problem with Chinese companies operating in Central Asia may lie in what 
the International Crisis group describes as a ‘[failure] to connect to their host communities, 
preferring to concentrate on developing relationships with power brokers in the capitals or, as 
need be, at the local level’.35 Whatever the discord is between Chinese business practices and 
Central Asian residents, the sentiments are not entirely one-sided, with Chinese workers 
describing Kazakhstan as a ‘highly unpleasant place to work’, on account of preconceived 
prejudices against workers from China.36 
Taking the aforementioned global developments into consideration, the expansion of 
Chinese trade with Central Asia does not necessarily prefigure the wholesale expansion of 
Chinese influence over the region. While trade has indeed increased from 1992 levels of $572 
million to $30 billion in 2010, these numbers are commensurate with additional trade 
associations Beijing has been pursuing. For example, Sino-Japanese trade has risen three-fold 
since 2000 to more than $300 billion and trade with Vietnam grew by $9 billion in a single year 
                                                          
30 ‘Rossiya uvelichivaet postavki nefti v Kitai na 9 milionov tonn’ , Russkaya sluzhba BBC, 25 February (2013), 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/business/2013/02/130225_russia_china_gas_dvorkovich.shtml> [accessed 22 February 2014]. 
31 Anna Solodovnikova and Natalia  Skorlygina, ‘Zhyostkih pravil uregulorivaniya  ne budet’  Kommersant website, < 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2229666?isSearch=True> [accessed 25 February 2014]. 
32 Charles Recknagel, ‘Aging Farm Machinery Hampers Central Asian Productivity ‘, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
website (2013), < http://www.rferl.org/content/central-asia-aging-farms/24976547.html> [accessed 16 November 2013]. 
33 Ainur Alimova and Antoine Blua, ‘On The Road With Kazakhstan’s Women Shuttle Traders’, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty website (2013), < http://www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstan-women-shuttle-traders/24974097.html> [accessed 16 
November 2013]. 
34 Marlene Laurelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, The Chinese Question in Central Asia: Domestic Order, Social Change, and the 
Chinese Factor (Columbia University Press, 2012), pp. 168-171. 
35 ‘China’s Central Asian Problem’, in Asia Report, Number 244 (2013), p. 14, 
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/244-chinas-central-asia-problem.pdf > [accessed 16 
November 2013]. 
36 Ibid., p.15.  
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from 2010-11 to $36 billion annually, yet it would be hard to characterize relations between 
Beijing, Tokyo, and Hanoi in terms of imminent economic takeover.37 
Geographic proximity will certainly play in China’s favor when discussing Sino-Central 
Asian trade links and there is no doubt that Moscow is financially incapable of matching 
Beijing’s ability to dole out huge loans on favorable terms. In the realm of security influence, 
however, China has continued to lag behind Russia.38 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) traces its roots back to an organization first established in the mid 1990’s. Described as 
‘the only multilateral organization that has been set up by China’,39 ostensibly to substantiate 
its regional presence, the SCO has failed to engender the type of dialogue and collaboration 
Beijing had originally hoped for. Indeed, in the area of drug interdiction, despite ‘officials from 
the SCO states counter drug agencies meet[ing] regularly to discuss the status and prospects of 
joint efforts against trafficking’,40 narcotic flows continue unabated out of Afghanistan through 
Central Asia.41 
The literature exploring the inherent weaknesses of the SCO is substantial, but it suffices 
to say that cultural barriers remain a huge impediment to development. There is perhaps no 
better example of this than the training conducted by Chinese military academies for Central 
Asian officers which must be conducted in Russian, as both sides share a dearth of knowledge 
concerning their counterpart’s respective languages.42 Returning to Turkmenistan, it should 
also be noted that Ashgabat has thus far refused membership in China’s premier Central Asian 
club, notwithstanding deepened economic ties. 
Curiously, the Chinese government has also taken a hands-off approach to military 
hardware sales. Whereas Central Asian economic and energy opportunities have been of 
major concern to state-run companies and banks, Beijing has been content to limit regional 
joint training exercises and cap equipment transfer values at a few million dollars.43 The lack of 
                                                          
37 ‘China-Japan Dispute Takes Rising Toll on Top Asian Economies’, Bloomberg.com, 09 January (2013),  
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-08/china-japan-dispute-takes-rising-toll-of-asia-s-top-economies.html> 
[accessed 16 November 2013]; ’Vietnam Says China Must Avoid Trade Weapon in Maritime Spat’, Bloomberg.com, 03 
December (2012), < http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-02/vietnam-says-china-must-avoid-trade-weapon-in-
maritime-disputes.html> [accessed 16 November 2013]. 
38 Olga Dzyubenk, ‘China to expand C.Asian presence with $10 bln in loans’, Reuters.com, 05 December (2012), 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/05/china-centralasia-idUSL5E8N59DS20121205> [accessed 16 November 2013]; 
Wenren Jiang, ‘China Makes Strides in Energy “Go-out” Strategy’, The Jamestown Foundation website (2009), 
<http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35309&cHash=4c510fe3b9> [accessed 
16 November 2013]; Alexander Sodiqov, ‘China Boosts Investment in Tajikistan’, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst 
website (2009), <http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5141> [accessed 16 November 2013]. 
39  Marlene Laruelle and Sebastian Peyrouse, The Chinese Question in Central Asia (Hurst Publishing, 2012), p. 27. 
40 Julie Boland, ‘Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Lost Decade? A Partner for the U.S’, The 
Brookings Institution website (2011), p. 13, 
<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/6/shanghai%20cooperation%20organization%20boland/06_s
hanghai_cooperation_organization_boland.pdf > [accessed 16 November 2013]. 
41 ‘Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia’, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime website 
(2012), p.7, < http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_web.pdf> 
[accessed 16 November 2013]. 
42 Peyrouse, Boonstra and Laurelle, p. 13.   
43 ‘China’s Central Asian Problem’, p. 21.  
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an arms trade is surprising given the reported appetite of nations like Uzbekistan to acquire 
more modern kit for their security personnel.44 
We have seen that China’s position of strength in Central Asia is not monolithic, yet it is 
undoubtedly carving out a place for itself in territory Moscow believes to be its backyard. This 
begs the question: does China’s rise necessarily presage the decline of Russia’s prevalent 
position in Central Asia? 
If relying on comparisons of trade figures and loan packages, the answer would have to 
be in the affirmative. But the Russian government can rest assured in the mid-term knowing 
their position in Central Asia is upheld through significant historical/cultural ties, military 
alliances, and a unique form of economic leverage. Combined, these links currently outweigh 
the inroads China has made in Central Asia in the previous decade. 
 The number of ethnic Russians residing in Central Asia has notably decreased since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Their combined total currently stands at roughly 7 million. The 
vast majority continues to live in Kazakhstan, with over 4 million Russians, despite a decline 
in the percentage of the total population. Ethnic Russians make up 12 percent of the 
population in Kyrgyzstan; 6 percent in Uzbekistan; 4 percent in Turkmenistan; and 1 percent 
in Tajikistan.45 
Despite the diminished position for ethnic Russians in the Central Asian republics, the 
Russian language remains central to daily communication in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
where it enjoys constitutional protection and maintains a viable role for the educated elite and 
foreigners in the larger cities of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.46 
A 2010 paper by the Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team (CADGAT), a 
joint research project between the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the OSCE 
Academy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, sheds more light on the issue of language in Central Asian 
cultural life. Their findings provide a picture of a region that has seen steady growth in the use 
of native languages, but also one in which Russian continues to be an indispensible element.47 
As an example, CADGAT describes Russian as predominant in the Kazakhstani media 
landscape, noting that out of 215 radio and television channels a mere five are broadcast in the 
Kazakh language.48 In neighboring Kyrgyzstan, the Russian channel Pervyi (1st Channel) was 
consistently found to have the largest numbers of viewers in the country.49 Further south in 
Tajikistan, 90% of foreign films and television shows were found to be translated only in 
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Russian, while in terms of print, the majority of books were composed in Russian, with the 
availability of Tajik literature being described as very limited.50 Print media in Uzbekistan also 
showed significant Russian influence. It was estimated that thirty to forty percent of 
magazines and newspapers in Tashkent were printed in Russian, while nine in ten books in 
the country were produced in Russian.51 Only in Turkmenistan, where the state controls many 
facets of life, has the Russian language seen a steep decline.52 Yet even here Russian remains in 
vogue among members of the Turkmen state apparatus and business community.53 
The leadership of Central Asian governments also shares extensive ties with their 
Russian counterparts in that most cut their teeth in the previous Soviet era bureaucracy, with 
some, like Kazakh President Nazarbaev and Uzbek strongman Islam Karimov, inheriting their 
positions of power as a result of being communist party functionaries. Turkmenistan’s leader 
Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov was a member of the socialist youth organization Komsomol 
and also attended university for a number of years in Russia.54 
While a collective Soviet past has not kept Central Asian governments from establishing 
ties with China and the West, it does provide Russian and Central Asian elites with a level of 
mutual intimacy that is currently non-existent for Chinese powerbrokers hoping to further 
consolidate their role in the region. 
The familiarity with Russian culture is perhaps one reason for the vast northward flow 
of Central Asian migrants who are estimated to number approximately 3.5 million of those 
seeking work in Russia due to a lack of job prospects in their home countries.55 While Sino-
Tajik bilateral trade runs over half a billion euros ($658 million) and Bishkek ranks Beijing as 
its number one trade partner with bilateral trade just shy of €3.5 billion ($4.6 billion), these 
numbers must be considered alongside the annual remittances emanating from the Russian 
Federation.56 
According to the World Bank’s Migration and Development Brief, in 2011, 49 percent of 
Tajikistan’s GDP consisted of foreign remittances, while in the same year the Kyrgyz Republic 
relied on 29 percent of its overall GDP from migrant workers.57 Foreign money transfers were 
reported to have made up around 10 percent ($4.5 billion) of Uzbekistan’s GDP in 2011.58  
Jumping ahead to early 2014, these trends appear to be continuing, as it was recently reported 
that half of all remittances sourced in Russia flow to Central Asia, with Kyrgyzstan, 
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Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan receiving the lion’s share of those money transfers.59 Returning to 
the Chinese bilateral trade figures for a moment, when comparing the dollar amount of total 
trade versus Russian sourced remittances in side by side analysis, Chinese economic 
dominance comes into question. 
In 2011, Tajikistan’s total GDP was approximately $6.5 billion60, meaning Sino-Tajik 
trade ($658 million) comprised around 10 percent of Tajikistan’s Gross Domestic Product. 
Compare this to the almost 50 percent of GDP which came from Russian-sourced remittances. 
Uzbek remunerations of $4.5 billion also far surpassed trade between Tashkent and Beijing, 
which totaled approximately $2.4 billion the previous year.61 Among the Central Asian 
nations, Kyrgyzstan, with a GDP of around $6.2 billion, is the only one that could be 
considered to have a dependent trade relationship with Beijing. 
In terms of percentage of the population employed as migrant workers in the Russian 
Federation (and to a much lesser extent Kazakhstan), Central Asia appears highly reliant on 
north-south labor flows. At the peak in the years between 2004 and 2008, 2.5 million Uzbeks, 
1.5 million Tajiks, and 800,000 Kyrgyz were reported to have left their homes in search of 
northern work, the majority ending up in Russia, many of whom ultimately found jobs in a 
booming construction sector.62 
Any discussion on Russia’s economic influence in Central Asia must also consider the 
implications of the recently established Customs Union (CU).  This entity, formally launched 
in 2010 as an agreement between the governments of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, seeks to 
create a single economic space among the three nations. With a set of agreed upon import 
tariffs, common rules related to documentation, and the elimination of some internal border 
controls, the hope is to foster regional assimilation through streamlined processes by which 
goods and people between CU member states can move.63 Its goal is to eventually draw more 
nations into the fold, thus increasing its economic power to act as a balance against entities like 
the EU.  Having only been up and running for a few years, it is premature to say if it will 
portend greater regional integration, with Moscow serving as the guiding vehicle. At the 
moment it appears that Tajik and Kyrgyz entry into the Customs Union are the most likely in 
the short term, with both governments seeming bullish about their prospects. Tajikistan’s 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade has said that ‘[t]he admission of Tajikistan to 
the Customs Union will be a significant step towards economic integration with Russia and 
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other Customs Union members’.64 Former acting President of Kyrgyzstan Rosa Otombaeva 
also commented in a 2011 speech on the possibility of Bishkek’s accession, saying that Kyrgyz 
entry ‘is highly important to us’.65 
Certainly President Putin has not been averse to leveraging the economic wedge of 
Central Asian remittances in his quest for new Customs Union members. Speaking at the 
Russian state of the nation address in 2012, Putin made it clear that citizens of Custom Union 
nations hoping to enter the Russian Federation would not be subject to travel document 
enhancements that are scheduled to be in place by 2015.66 
The cultural and economic links Russia retains in Central Asia are real and extensive, 
but considering that Chinese trade and investment have begun to surpass levels that took 
Russia two-hundred years to establish and nurture should certainly give Moscow cause for 
concern. Yet in the two other spheres mentioned earlier, security and energy, Central Asia 
remains firmly placed in the Kremlin’s orbit. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In Central Asia, energy, economics, and security are often mentioned as three disparate issues 
with a common denominator. We return again to Sino-Turkmen energy cooperation to see 
what that relationship has meant for Russia in the wider framework of its regional energy 
interests. 
Following an agreement signed in June 2012 between Turkmenistan’s national gas 
company and the CNPC, future Turkmen gas deliveries are slated to eventually reach 2.3 
trillion cubic feet/ year.67 This development, coupled with the thirty-five year production 
sharing agreement between Turkmenistan and China which confers on the CNCP the status of 
‘the only foreign company with direct access to an onshore development’ in Turkmenistan, is 
indicative of Ashgabat’s outlier status among its neighbors concerning energy relations with 
China.68 
Turkmenistan aside, it is apparent that Moscow is still the dominant regional energy 
player. Kazakhstan’s two largest oil pipelines with a combined export capacity of 1.42 million 
bpd both terminate on Russian territory – in Novorossiysk and Samara, respectively.69 This is 
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compared to the Kazakh-China pipeline which after a planned expansion will have an export 
capacity of 400,000 barrels per day.70 
Tajikistan remains heavily reliant on Russia for domestic energy needs, importing 90 
percent of all petroleum products from the Russian Federation,71 while neighboring 
Kyrgyzstan brings in 92 percent of its fuel from Russia.72 Uzbekistan, with the region’s largest 
population of 28 million people, consumes most internally produced natural gas but sends 
more than half of its remaining gas export capacity through Russia.73 
In classical fashion, the Russian government, unlike their Chinese counterparts, has 
been able to deftly maneuver in Central Asian energy affairs, economics, and culture to 
maintain a small yet regionally significant military alliance with its former Soviet partners. It 
must be said, however, that the Chinese leadership remains wary of extending itself too 
deeply into any situation that could result in armed conflict, and their lack of engagement in 
this respect has likely been calculated. 
Under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Moscow 
continues to sell military hardware to Central Asia at discounted rates, maintaining ‘a near 
monopoly on arms sales to the region’.74 The International Crisis Group notes that through the 
penury of the Tajiks and Kyrgyz, Russia has retained basing rights in each country, 
maintaining the 7,000 strong 201st Division in Tajikistan and continuing to control the Kant 
airbase outside Bishkek.75 The former represents one of Moscow’s largest foreign troop 
contingents in the world.76 
Finally, in 2001 the Russian military, together with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and 
Kyrgyzstan developed a small rapid reaction force headquartered in Kyrgyzstan totaling 
around 5,000 troops.77 This force is yet to be tested in a real security threat scenario and has 
been the source of criticism that compared it to a paper tiger following outbreaks of revolution 
and ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan. But undoubtedly the security cooperation among Russia 
and its southern neighbors is far ahead of China’s military links through the SCO, who’s 
‘obsession with consensus and for maintaining the status quo has hampered [its] 
effectiveness’.78 
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The alarmist reaction to China’s presence in Central Asia seems to flow from the same 
narrative that assumes that China, with its hulking land mass, increased military spending, 
and seemingly inexhaustible supply of human labor, is destined to one day control the world. 
That Central Asia – a vast, sparsely inhabited area with a wealth of natural resources placed 
directly west of China’s borders – should be consumed by its giant neighbor seems a natural 
progression of what has been a remarkable journey for the Chinese since economic 
liberalization began in the late 1970s. 
Taken at face value, Chinese investments in Central Asia are indeed outstripping the 
United States, the European Union, and Russia. Because of the geographic distance in the case 
of the EU and America, or the shrinking population and lopsided economy of Russia, it is 
doubtful that any player will be able to match China on a dollar for dollar basis in the coming 
years. 
Yet, as has been discussed, relying only on figures concerning outsized Chinese FDI and 
bi-lateral loan guarantees masks a much more complex dynamic. Beyond the superficialities, it 
is clear, that twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia’s position in Central 
Asia is far more dominant than is often reported. Pundits may grant that Moscow’s security 
arrangements with Central Asia are more extensive and superior to those held by China, but 
when discussing energy and economic cooperation the headlines should be more circumspect. 
With the exception of Turkmen gas exports and Kyrgyz bilateral trade, China remains 
eclipsed by Moscow’s shadow in Central Asia. Were it not for foreign remittances springing 
from Russia, the economies of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan would suffer major contractions. 
Furthermore, without the Russian controlled energy pipeline network, Central Asian states 
like Kazakhstan would be extremely hard pressed to transport its major commodities to 
market. 
Through the millions of ethnic Russians who still call Central Asia home, as well as the 
ubiquity of the Russian language and satellite television programs, the Kremlin has been able 
to maintain a cultural beachhead in former Soviet Asia at little cost. Perhaps aware of the 
security vulnerabilities that have arisen due to the inability to reach regional consensus, 
Central Asia’s leaders have also been content to rely in their military preservation on Moscow, 
which is more than happy to assume the role of protector. 
If another Great Game is already afoot in Central Asia, China has shown itself to be a 
worthy competitor, but Russia, with a significant head start, will be hard to catch in the 
foreseeable future. 
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